Introduction
Why do Political parties fail? The comparative literature on political parties commonly holds that parties have four aims: to win representation in the legislature, to form or support governments, to shape policy, and most fundamentally, to survive as organisations. Indeed, these goals lie at the heart of the definition of political parties (e.g. Sartori 1976 ), even if particular parties might also pursue other goals such as the personal enrichment of their members. Much of the literature on political parties, both in Western and East Central Europe, focuses on the success stories. Less has been written about parties that fail (but see Lawson and Merkl 1988 , Buelens and Hino 2008 , Brug et al 2005 , Wincławska 2010 ). This is hardly surprising, since, as Pridham once observed (1988, p. 230) : 'party failure [in Western Europe] in any absolute or quasi-absolute sense is a rare phenomenon and almost certainly attributable to exceptional circumstances.' Party failure has of course been more common in post-communist Central Europe, even in the more stable party systems, but until recently most of the parties that failed were relatively short-lived and their failure could be seen as part of the process of party system consolidation (Bakke and Sitter 2005) . In Poland the mergers and splits on the post-Solidarity right is a case in point: Solidarity Electoral Action fell apart after one electoral cycle because it failed to institutionalise and develop a 'structure and ideological profile that could hold together a fractious and eclectic grouping in the long term' (Szczerbiak 2007, p.56) . This picture changed with the 2010 earthquake elections in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, when five long-standing political parties failed to win representation in parliament and all but disappeared from the political scene. Their failure raises broader questions about what puts parties at risk; which is the reason why we focus on these three particular countries.
What does it mean for a party to fail? Is it enough that a party loses representation in parliament, and thereby ceases to fulfill key functions such as representation and policy making, or should failure be equated with the organisation ceasing to exist or operate? (Lawson and Merkl, 1988, p.4) . We have chosen to label the former 'failed' and the latter 'defunct' parties. We return to what happens to parties after they fail in a separate article (Bakke and Sitter, forthcoming) . The purpose of the present article is to explain why parties fail in the sense of losing their parliamentary representation. Fully 22 of the 37 parties that won representation in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia since 1990 subsequently failed. In most cases electoral failure led to organisational death as well: only one of the 22 parties that failed returned to parliament on its own (it failed again later). Of the rest, five merged with other parties, eight maintained some kind of activity (regional or European representation), and another eight are defunct or maintain only a 'zombie-like existence '. In what follows, we draw on the comparative politics tradition associated with Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and Sartori (1968) to suggest five factors that increase the risk of a party failing to win enough votes to cross the electoral threshold. The two first are related to the opportunity structure that parties face, and are normally beyond the control of small and medium-sized parties: 1) the electoral system and 2) the main dimensions of the party system and the salience of cleavages. Party strategy is to some extent a matter of how a party decides to deal with these constraints. Political parties have more control over the remaining three factors: 3) whether parties assume the role of a junior coalition partner, 4) how parties manage internal dissent about strategy or personnel politics, and 5) how parties organise.
These factors are not wholly independent (dissent and divisions often reflect disagreements about coalition strategy or policy), and merit investigation through case studies that allow us to explore the causal mechanisms at work. The main research strategy applied below is therefore based on qualitative analysis, and the data is drawn from party programmes, official party documents and statements, interviews and media reports, as well as from the national electoral offices. This is supplemented by a simple OLS regression designed to test the effect of membership, incumbency, party split and size on electoral failure, to complement the qualitative findings.
Strategy and Risk
The central research question in this article concerns the strategic choices that parties make that might expose them to loss of support and ultimately, the risk of electoral failure. The theoretical starting point is therefore party strategy -defined as a broad formula for how a party is going to compete, a combination of what its ends should be and by which means these should be pursued -and the risks that different strategic choices expose parties to (Sitter 2003, Bakke and Sitter 2005) . Political parties can be defined as organizations that pursue four broad goals -votes, office, policy, and continuous survival (Smith 1966 , Sartori 1967 , Panebianco 1980 , Mair 1997 . Maximising one goal may entail merely satisfying another, or even fully-blown trade-offs, and herein lies the dilemmas of party strategy (Sartori 1976 , Müller and Strøm 1999 , Katz and Mair 1995 . Focussing on policy goals that are salient to a specific group of voters might help mobilize that segment of the electorate, but limit a party's broader appeal (Kirchheimer 1966 , Epstein 1967 , Smith 1993 . Joining a governing coalition secures access to office and influence over policy (Budge and Keman 1990, Budge and Laver 1992) , but might come at a cost of association with unpopular policies and internal dissent (Laver and Schofield 1990, Strøm 1990) . Building a strong organisation might constrain the leadership's freedom of manoeuvre with regard to the pursuit of policy and office (Luebbert 1986 , Tsebelis 1990 , Maor 1992 . Conversely, maintaining a more leadership-dominated, less institutionalised party may expose a party to the risk of formal splits if disagreements on leadership, policy or coalition strategy cannot be contained (Gunther and Hopkin 2002 , Heinisch 2003 , Luther 2011 . Each of the goals that a party pursues thus entails one or more risks.
The first set of risks is related to the parties' pursuit of votes and the rules of the game. Competition for votes takes place within the institutional logic shaped by electoral laws and by regulations about the operation and financing of political parties. Both tend to favour large parties, not least because these parties normally play the key part in drawing up the rules in the first place and amending them later (Lipset and Rokkan 1967 , Rokkan 1970 , Lijphart 1992 , 1995 . Because state funding is normally allocated proportionally according to the parties' share of votes and/or seats in the latest election (IDEA 2003) , electorally small parties get lower state subventions. They are also less attractive to corporate and private sponsors (and anecdotal evidence suggests that this holds for patronage and illegal party finance as well). Their ability to finance costly election campaigns to win re-election will therefore be limited. Moreover, because the rational voter may not want to waste his vote on a party that is not likely to win representation, the risk of electoral failure increases when party support declines to a critical level -or in our case, drops below the five-percent electoral threshold in the opinion polls.
The second set of risks is directly linked to the question of how parties chose to pursue votes, given the rules of the game, by appealing to voters on policy issues. Strategies for electoral competition are about how parties interact with each other in the pursuit of votes, given the rules of the game and their competitors' strategies. Even if many parties use PR techniques from the world of advertising and some draw on charismatic leaders, clientelism and patronage, or even illegal party finance and corruption Diamond 2003, Kopecký 2006) , electoral competition across Europe is still fundamentally a matter of a party presenting a more or less coherent programme to the electorate. The main dimension of political competition in a party system emerges as the biggest parties parcel together salient issues: in Western Europe this has predominantly been a socio-economic left-right dimension (Sartori 1968 , Bartolini and Mair 1990 , Lijphart 1984 , whereas post-communist Europe initially saw more variation across states (see e.g. Lijphart 1992 , Smith 1993 , Mair 1997 , Lewis 2005 , Bakke and Sitter 2005 . The central question for smaller parties is how to position themselves in the party system: whether to compete with the biggest parties along the main axis of the party system (the catch-all strategy); develop their own niche that crosscuts the main dimension (the issue party strategy); or position themselves as 'protest parties' on the flanks (the flank strategy). Each entails its own risk. When cleavages or issues change in salience, should parties respond by adapting their policies and electoral appeal or maintain the focus on their (declining) core? This question lay at the heart of the de-/re-alignment debate in West European politics (Rose and Urwin 1970 , Inglehart 1971 , Wolinetz 1979 Daalder and Mair 1983, Arter 2001) ; in post-communist Central Europe it is linked to the changing salience of regime change and state-building (Kitschelt 1992 (Kitschelt , 1995 . The risk to small or niche parties is that the salience of their core issues declines, their target group becomes smaller or they are crowded out by larger competitors moving onto their policy turf.
The third set of risks is related to how political parties seek to influence policy directly by forming a government or joining a government coalition, or indirectly by supporting a government in return for policy concessions. Participation in government can improve the party's chances in the next election if handled well (Dunleavy 1990 ), but it can also harm the party's prospects. The risk associated with the pursuit of office has long been clear: government parties in Western Europe lose more electoral support than opposition parties (Rose and Mackie 1983 , van der Brug et al 2005 , p.539, Buelens and Hino 2008 . studies of minority coalitions in Western Europe (Strøm 1990, Müller and Strøm 1999) have concluded that smaller parties achieve their policy goals at lower costs when they support minority coalitions from the outside rather than join them. Formal participation in government might entail costs in terms of taking the blame for unpopular policies over which they had little control. Given that, as a rule, incumbent governing parties in Central Europe lost elections in the first two post-communist decades, the price of power may have been higher than in Western Europe. Political parties that served as junior partners in a coalition were at risk: much rested on their ability to influence government policy, and to take credit for this.
The fourth and fifth sets of risks are both linked to how parties organize: how robust the party organization is and how well it copes with dissent. According to Enyedi (2006, p.234) , party organizations in post-communist countries vary considerably in terms of complexity (number of branches and hierarchical levels) and membership, but they typically mimic the mass party model, with national congresses, by-laws and full-time staff. While the pursuit of policy and office may entail risks of losing votes, a strong organization should be an advantage: a well-organised party will have a larger pool of candidates and volunteer election workers, multiple financial sources, and therefore better capacity to remain visible 'on the ground' than a weaker party. Conversely, weak institutionalisation and internal strife and defections may cause parties to lose votes, and weak parties may be more vulnerable to elite defections. Organisational weakness, particularly in terms of a small membership base, can therefore be seen as a potential risk in and of itself. This is somewhat distinct from a second aspect of party organisation: a party's capacity for managing internal divisions. The risk of collapse where cohesion is lost over an important policy issue, coalition strategy or a generational change of leadership, and a party formally splits into two parliamentary caucuses or organisations, is therefore our fifth risk factor.
Institutions, party systems and failed parties in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary
Under normal circumstances political institutions may be considered exogenous factors as far as most political parties are concerned. However, in exceptional circumstances the parties can combine to shape key institutions that set the parameters for political parties' competitionthe electoral system, the rules for making and breaking governments, rules on party organisation, finance and electoral competition -that work in the interest of the very parties that design them. This helps explain the stability of West European party systems (Rokkan 1970 , Lijphart 1995 , and the constitutional choices made in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and its two successor states during the transition from communism (Lijphart 1992) .
In Hungary, the new institutional set-up was negotiated at the roundtable in 1989 and adopted during the spring of 1990. The 1989-90 roundtable compromise included a mixed electoral system that saw 176 of 386 MPs elected by majority vote in single-member constituencies; up to 152 seats were distributed based on regional proportional list votes; and the remaining seats were distributed on a national basis. Over the next two decades, this system generally worked in favour of the biggest parties, leaving the smaller parties to struggle to cross the five-percent electoral threshold. The effect of these arrangements on the prospects for big, small and medium-sized parties differed somewhat across the three cases: the mixed Hungarian system favoured large parties (Benoit 2005) , because qualification for the PR part was based on participation in the majoritarian part of the system, and because the PR section rewarded the parties that came second in the majoritarian section. Parties that entered parliament but won less than 20 percent of the vote were consistently underrepresented (the single exception is the Hungarian Democratic Forum in 1998, which won 17 single member seats but fell below the threshold to qualify for PR seats). In contrast, the List PR systems adopted in the Czech Republic and Slovakia generated more proportional outcomes and favoured a multi-party system (Lijphart 1992 , Birch 2003 , but more so in the Slovak than in the Czech case, because of consistently larger constituencies (Slovakia has been one constituency since 1998).
Laws and regulations governing the operation and financing of political parties have also worked against small (and new) parties. State funding primarily benefits large parliamentary parties, and the election laws of all three countries have included stipulations requiring parties to collect signatures, pay election deposits or both, in order to run. In Hungary, the requirement has been 750 signatures per candidate in single member districts, a minimum of 11,000-15,000 signatures to run at national level, and a maximum of 132,000
signatures to run in all constituencies. In the two other countries, the initial requirement was 10,000 members and/or signatures -which has later been replaced by election deposits, returnable only if the party crosses the electoral threshold (Czech Republic) or a separate threshold (2 percent in Slovakia at present). For small parties there is thus an economic risk involved in running (Bakke and Sitter, forthcoming) . Therefore, given the rules of the game in these three cases and the comparative lessons from Western Europe, it came as no surprise that by the end of the second decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall the three party systems seemed relatively stable and featured a solid core of large and mid-sized parties combined with the collapse (or precarious survival) of some of the smaller parties along the road (Bakke and Sitter 2005) .
In Hungary the first two decades after 1989 saw a transformation from a party system of three blocs and six parties to a two-bloc system. In the 1990 election, a broad three-party Table 1 lists all parties that won representation in the three national parliaments on their own at least once, but subsequently failed (see also appendix 1). The table shows that two thirds of the failed parties had been represented in parliament for only one or two election periods when they fell below the threshold. However, five of the six parties that failed in 2010 were long-term parties with a continuous presence since the early 1990s. All party families are represented among the failed parties, as well as among the present parliamentary parties, and no party family seems to be particularly more vulnerable than others, with the possible exception of liberal parties. We now turn to our research question:
why do parties fall below the electoral threshold? The following sections are structured around the five broad risk factors set out in the brief literature review above.
Taking their fate in their own hands: party organisation, coalitions and divisions
We start with the factors parties have some control over: participation in government, management of internal dissent and the robustness of the party organization. As we argued in section two: if government participation comes at a price, junior partners should be more vulnerable to the wear and tear of government than larger government parties, and they should also be more likely to fall below the threshold than opposition parties. Likewise, it might be reasonable to expect internally divided and weakly organised parties to be more at risk of failing than united and well organised parties with many members.
Because it is difficult to find precise information on other aspects of organizational Regardless of the cause, a formal split did increase the risk of electoral failure in the subsequent election significantly, and this finding is even stronger when we exclude big parties: Pearson's R=0.429 for all parties and 0.499 for parties that got less than 15 percent of the vote in the previous election (both significant at .01 level). Parties that split were more than three times more likely to fall below the electoral threshold in any given election than parties that stayed together, and small and medium-sized parties were most vulnerable (table   3) . In some cases the party had dropped below the five-percent threshold in opinion polls before the split, and the split was therefore not the cause of failure. But even if we code these as no split, the correlation between electoral failure and party split remains strong (Pearson's R=0.454 for all parties and 0.426 for parties under 15 percent, respectively). Hungary, parties with less than 10,000 members have rarely won election, perhaps because it is hard to collect the required number of signatures without members to do the job. We conclude this part of the analysis by having a look at how these three risk factors interact with each other and with size. Since no party has failed after receiving more than 15 percent of the votes in the previous election, we have excluded big parties from the analysis.
Our units are one party in one election (N=73). The dependent variable is electoral failure, defined as falling below the five-percent threshold, which is dummy-coded (0=yes, 1=no).
The independent variables are incumbent government party (0=yes, 1=no), membership (0=below 15,000, 1=over15,000), split in last election period (0=yes, 1=no), and size (0=under 7.5 percent in previous election, 1=over 7.5 percent). Parties that did not win representation in the previous election are omitted. The results are reported in table 5. As expected, the effect of being an incumbent junior partner is close to zero, while the effect of membership is weak and significant only at .05 level in just one of the models. Party split has the strongest effect, followed by size (under/over 7.5 percent in the previous election); both variables are significant at .01 level.
The most lethal combination is a low starting point (under 7.5 percent of the votes in the previous election) and a formal split prior to the election. Add low membership to the mix, and 100 percent of the parties failed. Conversely, medium-sized parties in opposition that kept together won re-election. That small parties are more vulnerable to electoral failure, is a quite straight-forward effect of the electoral system. Voters will not waste their vote on a party they think will fail. At elite level, loss of support tend to augment elite rivalry and conflicts over strategy (and vice versa), as elites start bickering over who to blame and what to do. Parties that for some reason start to lose support thus go into a negative spiral, and once a party has dropped permanently below the electoral threshold on the opinion polls, its chances of re-election are slim. Most parties that failed, were below the threshold two months or more before the election, and the rest were close to the threshold. Finally, the KSS in Slovakia, as well as the regionalist HSD-SMS and the nationalist Republicans in the Czech Republic failed after going through (several) splits, but this was hardly the only cause of failure, perhaps not even the most important. In the next section we therefore turn to the opportunity structure.
The party system as context: issue salience and opportunity structure
The final political risk factor identified above is related to changes in the opportunity structures parties face. It depends on three variables that are related to each other: the extent to which the salience of the cleavages or issues change, how the main dimension of competition in a party system changes, and how the party in question adapts to these changes. Finally, small and medium-sized parties that had a stable constituency were less vulnerable to failure, even if one or two of the risk factors were present. The KDU-ČSL won re-election as a government junior partner four times, and failed only when this was combined with a split over coalition strategy. The KDH won re-election as a government junior partner three times, even in 2002, after the Dzurinda faction had left for the SDKÚ. In both cases, the party enjoyed a stable constituency consisting of devout Catholics. The SNS won re-election as government junior partner twice, and when it failed, this was due to personal clashes between party elites. The SMK had the most stable constituency of all parties in Slovakia, consisting of ethnic Hungarians, and won re-election as a junior government party twice. The Most-Híd did the same in 2012.
Conclusion -party strategy and political risk
Given the diversity of the parties examined in this paper, it is tempting to conclude that, like
Tolstoy's unhappy families, each failing party is unhappy in its own particular way. Poorly organised parties have failed, but so have several well-organised parties with large memberships. Many have failed after service as junior partners in an unpopular government, but some parties failed from opposition and some failed parties never saw executive office.
Parties have failed because they failed to stake out a clear and distinct space on the left-right dimension, but extreme parties and niche parties have also failed. Yet our analysis has revealed that there are some clear patterns. Failed parties are not all unhappy in their own way.
First, most failing parties did suffer from a spell as a junior partner in government. 18 of the failed parties had been in government at least once, and when we started to write this article, only one party had ever survived junior government status in the long run: the KDH.
(After the 2012 election in Slovakia, the SaS and Most-Híd joined this exclusive club).
However, this turned out to be deceptive: most small parties that have had the chance to run for re-election have participated in coalition governments at some point, and the exceptions are either extreme leftist (KSS, KSČM) or extreme rightist parties (MIÉP, SPR-RSČ). The risk of failure is in fact only marginally bigger for junior government parties compared to small and medium-sized opposition parties. Second, a strong organisation with many members seems to be less important than we thought. Parties with few members have a slightly higher risk of failing than parties with many members -at least in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In Hungary most parliamentary parties have had at least mediumsized memberships. This is an effect of the electoral law, which requires parties to collect a large number of signatures before every election. Third, all parties are vulnerable to splits; indeed for many parties this is the single dominant cause of their demise. A formal split increases the risk of failure, especially for parties that won less than 7.5 percent of the votes in the previous election. Here there is a threshold effect at work: no party that had won more than 15 percent of the votes in the previous election failed. If the party kept together, the threshold was 10 percent (cf. table 3). Government fatigue obviously played a role indirectly:
the price of power might be measured in terms of lost popularity, but for many parties it is the resulting divisions over strategy that spells the end of the party.
Finally, the opportunity structure played a role. Some parties had a greater chance of surviving a spell in government or a party split than others, simply because they had a stable Parliamentary parties that failed, in percent. Parties with less than 5% in the previous election had won representation due to a lower electoral threshold (Slovakia, 1990) or in single member districts (MDF in Hungary, 1998). Failed parties in percent of parliamentary parties that ran for re-election in any given election and average number of members in failed and successful party at election. Own compilations. For details and sources, see also Appendix 2. 
